國立清華大學 114 年 《英文》

No one can say what causes the oceans’ chemistry to change so dramatically from time to time, but the opening and shutting of ocean ridges would be an obvious possible ____.

Claudia Townsend, associate professor of marketing in the Miami Herbert Business School, weighed in on the blockbuster rollout of the Barbie and Oppenheimer movies that ____ massive success at the box office.

The ____ VUCA has been used to refer to the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous nature of the times we live in.

It is a feature of modern Western culture that art has an almost religious significance. In particular, people who have no traditional religious consciousness often have this deep ____ for art.

The uncertain quality and expanding quantity of information pose large challenges for society. The sheer ____ of information will not in itself create a more informed citizenry without a complementary cluster of abilities necessary to use information effectively.

Simulations have shown that a gamma ray burst in our Milky Way could wipe out the stratospheric ozone layer for years, long enough to cause widespread ____.

Sometimes technologies that seem ____ and that we take for granted as part of everyday life have unanticipated consequences.

Currently, approval has been granted for inoculation administration to the 12-to-17-year-old ____ , and the target is to achieve the largest number of inoculations possible by the start of school in the Fall.

Since the queen is very powerful in the game of chess, a novice usually brings out the queen quickly, hoping to ____ the opponent.

Though lace is fairly ____ in today’s fashion world, it was once a delicate and upscale profession of femininity.

【題組共用題幹】

Memes are the Internet vernacular—which, nevertheless, does not make all of them universally understood, even among digitally savvy users. This situation also limits their benefits for the discussion about and among under-represented social categories. The prominent feature of memes is their coded nature—in order to unpack them, one has to be aware of the cultural, social, political and Internet-specific references. The most niche memes can be obscure to the majority, if they don’t follow a particular television show or a slang of a particular community, as an example. From this critical viewpoint, memes incorporate a sophisticated interplay of common sense and originality. Users appropriate memes to benefit from inclusivity in the circulation of an in-joke, and adjust it for the sake of exclusivity, attempting to draw an innovative rendition of a common pattern. The necessity to conform to the existing unwritten rules of conduct that shape online interaction preserves the recognizable features of the memetic format.

A recent study of the Belarusian youth and their uses of memes revealed that young people tend to see memes as “in-jokes” of their group of friends and would be embarrassed to share them with parents or older generation. This non-Western research proved the findings of the Western colleagues and suggested that youngsters have “local” memes for in-group sharing and “common” memes that they tolerate in the common space—the Internet at large.

The niche character of memetic communication as a slang of a group brings us to the first drawback of its exclusivity. Meme sharers are very sensitive to the changing trends and appropriation of memes by other groups and elites. When a meme appears in advertisement, for instance, the meme-sharing community ostracizes it as something outdated and untrendy.

The second shortcoming of the reputation of memes as “in-jokes” of the online community is the highly coded, postmodern and sophisticated message of a meme. Memes are coded messages and therefore can be confusing for various people; members of the audience may have varying abilities and skills to read the ‘code’. Those who are unfamiliar with the rules of digital discussion and styles of the Internet slang, or possess limited awareness of the broader sociopolitical context may consider memes meaningless. In order to be able to read a meme, one has to be digitally savvy or at least have basic familiarity with this format of communication. In some instances, memes can impede the inclusivity of communication—the issue of ‘meme divide’ questions the legacy of memes as the mutually understood lingua franca.

Which of the following statements about memes is most likely TRUE according to the author?

【題組共用題幹】

Memes are the Internet vernacular—which, nevertheless, does not make all of them universally understood, even among digitally savvy users. This situation also limits their benefits for the discussion about and among under-represented social categories. The prominent feature of memes is their coded nature—in order to unpack them, one has to be aware of the cultural, social, political and Internet-specific references. The most niche memes can be obscure to the majority, if they don’t follow a particular television show or a slang of a particular community, as an example. From this critical viewpoint, memes incorporate a sophisticated interplay of common sense and originality. Users appropriate memes to benefit from inclusivity in the circulation of an in-joke, and adjust it for the sake of exclusivity, attempting to draw an innovative rendition of a common pattern. The necessity to conform to the existing unwritten rules of conduct that shape online interaction preserves the recognizable features of the memetic format.

A recent study of the Belarusian youth and their uses of memes revealed that young people tend to see memes as “in-jokes” of their group of friends and would be embarrassed to share them with parents or older generation. This non-Western research proved the findings of the Western colleagues and suggested that youngsters have “local” memes for in-group sharing and “common” memes that they tolerate in the common space—the Internet at large.

The niche character of memetic communication as a slang of a group brings us to the first drawback of its exclusivity. Meme sharers are very sensitive to the changing trends and appropriation of memes by other groups and elites. When a meme appears in advertisement, for instance, the meme-sharing community ostracizes it as something outdated and untrendy.

The second shortcoming of the reputation of memes as “in-jokes” of the online community is the highly coded, postmodern and sophisticated message of a meme. Memes are coded messages and therefore can be confusing for various people; members of the audience may have varying abilities and skills to read the ‘code’. Those who are unfamiliar with the rules of digital discussion and styles of the Internet slang, or possess limited awareness of the broader sociopolitical context may consider memes meaningless. In order to be able to read a meme, one has to be digitally savvy or at least have basic familiarity with this format of communication. In some instances, memes can impede the inclusivity of communication—the issue of ‘meme divide’ questions the legacy of memes as the mutually understood lingua franca.

Which of the following words is NOT synonymous with the word “savvy” in the first sentence?

【題組共用題幹】

Memes are the Internet vernacular—which, nevertheless, does not make all of them universally understood, even among digitally savvy users. This situation also limits their benefits for the discussion about and among under-represented social categories. The prominent feature of memes is their coded nature—in order to unpack them, one has to be aware of the cultural, social, political and Internet-specific references. The most niche memes can be obscure to the majority, if they don’t follow a particular television show or a slang of a particular community, as an example. From this critical viewpoint, memes incorporate a sophisticated interplay of common sense and originality. Users appropriate memes to benefit from inclusivity in the circulation of an in-joke, and adjust it for the sake of exclusivity, attempting to draw an innovative rendition of a common pattern. The necessity to conform to the existing unwritten rules of conduct that shape online interaction preserves the recognizable features of the memetic format.

A recent study of the Belarusian youth and their uses of memes revealed that young people tend to see memes as “in-jokes” of their group of friends and would be embarrassed to share them with parents or older generation. This non-Western research proved the findings of the Western colleagues and suggested that youngsters have “local” memes for in-group sharing and “common” memes that they tolerate in the common space—the Internet at large.

The niche character of memetic communication as a slang of a group brings us to the first drawback of its exclusivity. Meme sharers are very sensitive to the changing trends and appropriation of memes by other groups and elites. When a meme appears in advertisement, for instance, the meme-sharing community ostracizes it as something outdated and untrendy.

The second shortcoming of the reputation of memes as “in-jokes” of the online community is the highly coded, postmodern and sophisticated message of a meme. Memes are coded messages and therefore can be confusing for various people; members of the audience may have varying abilities and skills to read the ‘code’. Those who are unfamiliar with the rules of digital discussion and styles of the Internet slang, or possess limited awareness of the broader sociopolitical context may consider memes meaningless. In order to be able to read a meme, one has to be digitally savvy or at least have basic familiarity with this format of communication. In some instances, memes can impede the inclusivity of communication—the issue of ‘meme divide’ questions the legacy of memes as the mutually understood lingua franca.

Which of the following statements is most likely TRUE according to the author?

【題組共用題幹】

Memes are the Internet vernacular—which, nevertheless, does not make all of them universally understood, even among digitally savvy users. This situation also limits their benefits for the discussion about and among under-represented social categories. The prominent feature of memes is their coded nature—in order to unpack them, one has to be aware of the cultural, social, political and Internet-specific references. The most niche memes can be obscure to the majority, if they don’t follow a particular television show or a slang of a particular community, as an example. From this critical viewpoint, memes incorporate a sophisticated interplay of common sense and originality. Users appropriate memes to benefit from inclusivity in the circulation of an in-joke, and adjust it for the sake of exclusivity, attempting to draw an innovative rendition of a common pattern. The necessity to conform to the existing unwritten rules of conduct that shape online interaction preserves the recognizable features of the memetic format.

A recent study of the Belarusian youth and their uses of memes revealed that young people tend to see memes as “in-jokes” of their group of friends and would be embarrassed to share them with parents or older generation. This non-Western research proved the findings of the Western colleagues and suggested that youngsters have “local” memes for in-group sharing and “common” memes that they tolerate in the common space—the Internet at large.

The niche character of memetic communication as a slang of a group brings us to the first drawback of its exclusivity. Meme sharers are very sensitive to the changing trends and appropriation of memes by other groups and elites. When a meme appears in advertisement, for instance, the meme-sharing community ostracizes it as something outdated and untrendy.

The second shortcoming of the reputation of memes as “in-jokes” of the online community is the highly coded, postmodern and sophisticated message of a meme. Memes are coded messages and therefore can be confusing for various people; members of the audience may have varying abilities and skills to read the ‘code’. Those who are unfamiliar with the rules of digital discussion and styles of the Internet slang, or possess limited awareness of the broader sociopolitical context may consider memes meaningless. In order to be able to read a meme, one has to be digitally savvy or at least have basic familiarity with this format of communication. In some instances, memes can impede the inclusivity of communication—the issue of ‘meme divide’ questions the legacy of memes as the mutually understood lingua franca.

Based on the passage, what can be inferred from the coded nature of memes?

【題組共用題幹】

Memes are the Internet vernacular—which, nevertheless, does not make all of them universally understood, even among digitally savvy users. This situation also limits their benefits for the discussion about and among under-represented social categories. The prominent feature of memes is their coded nature—in order to unpack them, one has to be aware of the cultural, social, political and Internet-specific references. The most niche memes can be obscure to the majority, if they don’t follow a particular television show or a slang of a particular community, as an example. From this critical viewpoint, memes incorporate a sophisticated interplay of common sense and originality. Users appropriate memes to benefit from inclusivity in the circulation of an in-joke, and adjust it for the sake of exclusivity, attempting to draw an innovative rendition of a common pattern. The necessity to conform to the existing unwritten rules of conduct that shape online interaction preserves the recognizable features of the memetic format.

A recent study of the Belarusian youth and their uses of memes revealed that young people tend to see memes as “in-jokes” of their group of friends and would be embarrassed to share them with parents or older generation. This non-Western research proved the findings of the Western colleagues and suggested that youngsters have “local” memes for in-group sharing and “common” memes that they tolerate in the common space—the Internet at large.

The niche character of memetic communication as a slang of a group brings us to the first drawback of its exclusivity. Meme sharers are very sensitive to the changing trends and appropriation of memes by other groups and elites. When a meme appears in advertisement, for instance, the meme-sharing community ostracizes it as something outdated and untrendy.

The second shortcoming of the reputation of memes as “in-jokes” of the online community is the highly coded, postmodern and sophisticated message of a meme. Memes are coded messages and therefore can be confusing for various people; members of the audience may have varying abilities and skills to read the ‘code’. Those who are unfamiliar with the rules of digital discussion and styles of the Internet slang, or possess limited awareness of the broader sociopolitical context may consider memes meaningless. In order to be able to read a meme, one has to be digitally savvy or at least have basic familiarity with this format of communication. In some instances, memes can impede the inclusivity of communication—the issue of ‘meme divide’ questions the legacy of memes as the mutually understood lingua franca.

Which of the following is closest in meaning to “ostracize” in the third paragraph?

【題組共用題幹】

Most people who survive a devastating disaster want the opposite of a clean slate: they want to salvage whatever they can and begin repairing what was not destroyed; they want to reaffirm their relatedness to the places that formed them. “When I rebuild the city I feel like I’m rebuilding myself,” said Cassandra Andrews, a resident of New Orleans’ heavily damaged Lower Ninth Ward, as she cleared away debris after Hurricane Katrina. But disaster capitalists have no interest in repairing what was. In Iraq, Sri Lanka and New Orleans, the process deceptively called “reconstruction” began with finishing the job of the original disaster by erasing what was left of the public sphere and rooted communities, then quickly moving to replace them with a kind of corporate New Jerusalem—all before the victims of war or natural disaster were able to regroup and stake their claims to what was theirs. Mike Battles puts it best: “For us, the fear and disorder offered real promise.” The thirty-four-year-old ex-CIA operative was talking about how the chaos in post-invasion Iraq had helped his unknown and inexperienced private security firm, Custer Battles, to shake roughly $100 million in contracts out of the federal government. His words could serve just as well as the slogan for contemporary capitalism—fear and disorder are the catalysts for each new leap forward.

When I began this research into the intersection between superprofits and megadisasters, I thought I was witnessing a fundamental change in the way the drive to “liberate” markets was advancing around the world. Having been part of the movement against ballooning corporate power that made its global debut in Seattle in 1999, I was accustomed to seeing similar business-friendly policies imposed through arm-twisting at World Trade Organization summits, or as the conditions attached to loans from the International Monetary Fund. The three trademark demands—privatization, government deregulation and deep cuts to social spending—tended to be extremely unpopular with citizens, but when the agreements were signed there was still at least the pretext of mutual consent between the governments doing the negotiating, as well as a consensus among the supposed experts. Now the same ideological program was being imposed via the most boldly coercive means possible: under foreign military occupation after an invasion, or immediately following a cataclysmic natural disaster. September 11 appeared to have provided Washington with the green light to stop asking countries if they wanted the U.S. version of “free trade and democracy” and to start imposing it with Shock and Awe military force.

As I dug deeper into the history of how this market model had swept the globe, however, I discovered that the idea of exploiting crisis and disaster has been the modus operandi of the American economist and Nobel laureate Milton Friedman’s movement from the very beginning—this fundamentalist form of capitalism has always needed disasters to advance. It was certainly the case that the facilitating disasters were getting bigger and more shocking, but what was happening in Iraq and New Orleans was not a new, post-September 11 invention. Rather, these bold experiments in crisis exploitation were the culmination of three decades of strict adherence to the shock doctrine.

Which of the following best describes the author’s attitude toward “the shock doctrine”?

【題組共用題幹】

Most people who survive a devastating disaster want the opposite of a clean slate: they want to salvage whatever they can and begin repairing what was not destroyed; they want to reaffirm their relatedness to the places that formed them. “When I rebuild the city I feel like I’m rebuilding myself,” said Cassandra Andrews, a resident of New Orleans’ heavily damaged Lower Ninth Ward, as she cleared away debris after Hurricane Katrina. But disaster capitalists have no interest in repairing what was. In Iraq, Sri Lanka and New Orleans, the process deceptively called “reconstruction” began with finishing the job of the original disaster by erasing what was left of the public sphere and rooted communities, then quickly moving to replace them with a kind of corporate New Jerusalem—all before the victims of war or natural disaster were able to regroup and stake their claims to what was theirs. Mike Battles puts it best: “For us, the fear and disorder offered real promise.” The thirty-four-year-old ex-CIA operative was talking about how the chaos in post-invasion Iraq had helped his unknown and inexperienced private security firm, Custer Battles, to shake roughly $100 million in contracts out of the federal government. His words could serve just as well as the slogan for contemporary capitalism—fear and disorder are the catalysts for each new leap forward.

When I began this research into the intersection between superprofits and megadisasters, I thought I was witnessing a fundamental change in the way the drive to “liberate” markets was advancing around the world. Having been part of the movement against ballooning corporate power that made its global debut in Seattle in 1999, I was accustomed to seeing similar business-friendly policies imposed through arm-twisting at World Trade Organization summits, or as the conditions attached to loans from the International Monetary Fund. The three trademark demands—privatization, government deregulation and deep cuts to social spending—tended to be extremely unpopular with citizens, but when the agreements were signed there was still at least the pretext of mutual consent between the governments doing the negotiating, as well as a consensus among the supposed experts. Now the same ideological program was being imposed via the most boldly coercive means possible: under foreign military occupation after an invasion, or immediately following a cataclysmic natural disaster. September 11 appeared to have provided Washington with the green light to stop asking countries if they wanted the U.S. version of “free trade and democracy” and to start imposing it with Shock and Awe military force.

As I dug deeper into the history of how this market model had swept the globe, however, I discovered that the idea of exploiting crisis and disaster has been the modus operandi of the American economist and Nobel laureate Milton Friedman’s movement from the very beginning—this fundamentalist form of capitalism has always needed disasters to advance. It was certainly the case that the facilitating disasters were getting bigger and more shocking, but what was happening in Iraq and New Orleans was not a new, post-September 11 invention. Rather, these bold experiments in crisis exploitation were the culmination of three decades of strict adherence to the shock doctrine.

What does “modus operandi” in boldface in the last paragraph signify?

【題組共用題幹】

Most people who survive a devastating disaster want the opposite of a clean slate: they want to salvage whatever they can and begin repairing what was not destroyed; they want to reaffirm their relatedness to the places that formed them. “When I rebuild the city I feel like I’m rebuilding myself,” said Cassandra Andrews, a resident of New Orleans’ heavily damaged Lower Ninth Ward, as she cleared away debris after Hurricane Katrina. But disaster capitalists have no interest in repairing what was. In Iraq, Sri Lanka and New Orleans, the process deceptively called “reconstruction” began with finishing the job of the original disaster by erasing what was left of the public sphere and rooted communities, then quickly moving to replace them with a kind of corporate New Jerusalem—all before the victims of war or natural disaster were able to regroup and stake their claims to what was theirs. Mike Battles puts it best: “For us, the fear and disorder offered real promise.” The thirty-four-year-old ex-CIA operative was talking about how the chaos in post-invasion Iraq had helped his unknown and inexperienced private security firm, Custer Battles, to shake roughly $100 million in contracts out of the federal government. His words could serve just as well as the slogan for contemporary capitalism—fear and disorder are the catalysts for each new leap forward.

When I began this research into the intersection between superprofits and megadisasters, I thought I was witnessing a fundamental change in the way the drive to “liberate” markets was advancing around the world. Having been part of the movement against ballooning corporate power that made its global debut in Seattle in 1999, I was accustomed to seeing similar business-friendly policies imposed through arm-twisting at World Trade Organization summits, or as the conditions attached to loans from the International Monetary Fund. The three trademark demands—privatization, government deregulation and deep cuts to social spending—tended to be extremely unpopular with citizens, but when the agreements were signed there was still at least the pretext of mutual consent between the governments doing the negotiating, as well as a consensus among the supposed experts. Now the same ideological program was being imposed via the most boldly coercive means possible: under foreign military occupation after an invasion, or immediately following a cataclysmic natural disaster. September 11 appeared to have provided Washington with the green light to stop asking countries if they wanted the U.S. version of “free trade and democracy” and to start imposing it with Shock and Awe military force.

As I dug deeper into the history of how this market model had swept the globe, however, I discovered that the idea of exploiting crisis and disaster has been the modus operandi of the American economist and Nobel laureate Milton Friedman’s movement from the very beginning—this fundamentalist form of capitalism has always needed disasters to advance. It was certainly the case that the facilitating disasters were getting bigger and more shocking, but what was happening in Iraq and New Orleans was not a new, post-September 11 invention. Rather, these bold experiments in crisis exploitation were the culmination of three decades of strict adherence to the shock doctrine.

Based on the passage, which of the following statements would define “the shock doctrine” most sufficiently?

【題組共用題幹】

Most people who survive a devastating disaster want the opposite of a clean slate: they want to salvage whatever they can and begin repairing what was not destroyed; they want to reaffirm their relatedness to the places that formed them. “When I rebuild the city I feel like I’m rebuilding myself,” said Cassandra Andrews, a resident of New Orleans’ heavily damaged Lower Ninth Ward, as she cleared away debris after Hurricane Katrina. But disaster capitalists have no interest in repairing what was. In Iraq, Sri Lanka and New Orleans, the process deceptively called “reconstruction” began with finishing the job of the original disaster by erasing what was left of the public sphere and rooted communities, then quickly moving to replace them with a kind of corporate New Jerusalem—all before the victims of war or natural disaster were able to regroup and stake their claims to what was theirs. Mike Battles puts it best: “For us, the fear and disorder offered real promise.” The thirty-four-year-old ex-CIA operative was talking about how the chaos in post-invasion Iraq had helped his unknown and inexperienced private security firm, Custer Battles, to shake roughly $100 million in contracts out of the federal government. His words could serve just as well as the slogan for contemporary capitalism—fear and disorder are the catalysts for each new leap forward.

When I began this research into the intersection between superprofits and megadisasters, I thought I was witnessing a fundamental change in the way the drive to “liberate” markets was advancing around the world. Having been part of the movement against ballooning corporate power that made its global debut in Seattle in 1999, I was accustomed to seeing similar business-friendly policies imposed through arm-twisting at World Trade Organization summits, or as the conditions attached to loans from the International Monetary Fund. The three trademark demands—privatization, government deregulation and deep cuts to social spending—tended to be extremely unpopular with citizens, but when the agreements were signed there was still at least the pretext of mutual consent between the governments doing the negotiating, as well as a consensus among the supposed experts. Now the same ideological program was being imposed via the most boldly coercive means possible: under foreign military occupation after an invasion, or immediately following a cataclysmic natural disaster. September 11 appeared to have provided Washington with the green light to stop asking countries if they wanted the U.S. version of “free trade and democracy” and to start imposing it with Shock and Awe military force.

As I dug deeper into the history of how this market model had swept the globe, however, I discovered that the idea of exploiting crisis and disaster has been the modus operandi of the American economist and Nobel laureate Milton Friedman’s movement from the very beginning—this fundamentalist form of capitalism has always needed disasters to advance. It was certainly the case that the facilitating disasters were getting bigger and more shocking, but what was happening in Iraq and New Orleans was not a new, post-September 11 invention. Rather, these bold experiments in crisis exploitation were the culmination of three decades of strict adherence to the shock doctrine.

Following the author’s logic, which of the following would NOT be considered an example of shock doctrine?

【題組共用題幹】

Most people who survive a devastating disaster want the opposite of a clean slate: they want to salvage whatever they can and begin repairing what was not destroyed; they want to reaffirm their relatedness to the places that formed them. “When I rebuild the city I feel like I’m rebuilding myself,” said Cassandra Andrews, a resident of New Orleans’ heavily damaged Lower Ninth Ward, as she cleared away debris after Hurricane Katrina. But disaster capitalists have no interest in repairing what was. In Iraq, Sri Lanka and New Orleans, the process deceptively called “reconstruction” began with finishing the job of the original disaster by erasing what was left of the public sphere and rooted communities, then quickly moving to replace them with a kind of corporate New Jerusalem—all before the victims of war or natural disaster were able to regroup and stake their claims to what was theirs. Mike Battles puts it best: “For us, the fear and disorder offered real promise.” The thirty-four-year-old ex-CIA operative was talking about how the chaos in post-invasion Iraq had helped his unknown and inexperienced private security firm, Custer Battles, to shake roughly $100 million in contracts out of the federal government. His words could serve just as well as the slogan for contemporary capitalism—fear and disorder are the catalysts for each new leap forward.

When I began this research into the intersection between superprofits and megadisasters, I thought I was witnessing a fundamental change in the way the drive to “liberate” markets was advancing around the world. Having been part of the movement against ballooning corporate power that made its global debut in Seattle in 1999, I was accustomed to seeing similar business-friendly policies imposed through arm-twisting at World Trade Organization summits, or as the conditions attached to loans from the International Monetary Fund. The three trademark demands—privatization, government deregulation and deep cuts to social spending—tended to be extremely unpopular with citizens, but when the agreements were signed there was still at least the pretext of mutual consent between the governments doing the negotiating, as well as a consensus among the supposed experts. Now the same ideological program was being imposed via the most boldly coercive means possible: under foreign military occupation after an invasion, or immediately following a cataclysmic natural disaster. September 11 appeared to have provided Washington with the green light to stop asking countries if they wanted the U.S. version of “free trade and democracy” and to start imposing it with Shock and Awe military force.

As I dug deeper into the history of how this market model had swept the globe, however, I discovered that the idea of exploiting crisis and disaster has been the modus operandi of the American economist and Nobel laureate Milton Friedman’s movement from the very beginning—this fundamentalist form of capitalism has always needed disasters to advance. It was certainly the case that the facilitating disasters were getting bigger and more shocking, but what was happening in Iraq and New Orleans was not a new, post-September 11 invention. Rather, these bold experiments in crisis exploitation were the culmination of three decades of strict adherence to the shock doctrine.

What does “them” in boldface in the first paragraph refer to?

【題組共用題幹】

In the environmental vision of the planet as it emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, few issues galvanized political debates as well as the cultural imagination as much as what was then referred to as “overpopulation.” Demographers and environmentalists pointed not only to the growth of Earth’s human population—from approximately five hundred million in 1650 to one billion around 1850, two billion in 1930, and three billion in 1960—but also the rapidly accelerating pace of this increase, warning that it might lead to unprecedented environmental devastation and human misery. Annual percentage increases in populations, they pointed out, might appear deceptively low, but a yearly increase of 2 percent means a doubling in thirty-five years, while a 3 percent increase implies a doubling in twenty-four years. Few countries, they argued, are prepared to double their food and energy supplies, housing, and educational and medical facilities in so short a time, and as a consequence they forecast dire panoramas of mass starvation and immiseration. Governments and international institutions were encouraged to take resolute measures to limit further increase in the growth rates, though the reproductive momentum of the already existing population implied that growth itself would continue for decades to come. “POPULATION EXPLOSION: Unique in human experience, an event which happened yesterday but which everyone swears won’t happen until tomorrow,” novelist John Brunner summed up the problem sarcastically in his novel Stand on Zanzibar.

The political controversies that ensued from this concern are well known. Millions of people did starve in the developing world in the 1970s and 1980s, though not at the rate environmentalists had predicted. Leftist critics, especially, argued that these deaths were due to problems in food distribution and more generally to staggering social inequalities rather than any overall scarcity. Population control measures, including the one-child policy in China and widespread sterilization campaigns in India, came under criticism for their disregard of individual rights and their neocolonial imposition of reproductive constraints on some of the world’s poorest populations. More broadly, critics asked whether looming scarcity crises and environmental devastation were caused principally by rampant population growth in the developing world or by rampant increases in consumption in the developed world.

By the 1990s, however, most of these controversies had abated. Even though the world population reached six billion in October 1999—double the number of 1960—this event was no longer accompanied by the images of mass starvation and nightmarishly overcrowded spaces it conjured up in the 1960s and 1970s. In part, this is no doubt due to changed growth projections for the future. Although the world population will, according to the most recent UN projections, continue to grow until the middle of the twenty-first century and will add approximately another 40 percent to the 2005 figure of 6.5 billion (the UN forecasts a population of 9.1 billion for 2050), it is now clear that this increase will affect particular regions in very different ways. Whereas a number of industrialized nations, for example Japan, Italy, Germany, the Baltic states, and most of the countries that succeeded the Soviet Union, will face shrinking populations, other countries such as India, Pakistan, China, and several states of sub-Saharan Africa will continue to grow, with the attendant challenges of providing education, jobs, and medical care to an ever-increasing number of people. As far as population figures are concerned, then, the future will be a divided one, with industrialized countries significantly less affected by continued population growth than in the past.

Here are three statements concerning the problem of overpopulation:

I. In the 1960s and 1970s, projections of a future of food shortages due to the explosion of population were common in the cultural imagination.

II. Out of the fear of overpopulation, widespread sterilization campaigns in India in the 1970s and 1980s were well accepted as an effective method of containing population growth.

III. Novelist John Brunner believed that population explosion would not happen until tomorrow.

Based on the passage,

【題組共用題幹】

In the environmental vision of the planet as it emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, few issues galvanized political debates as well as the cultural imagination as much as what was then referred to as “overpopulation.” Demographers and environmentalists pointed not only to the growth of Earth’s human population—from approximately five hundred million in 1650 to one billion around 1850, two billion in 1930, and three billion in 1960—but also the rapidly accelerating pace of this increase, warning that it might lead to unprecedented environmental devastation and human misery. Annual percentage increases in populations, they pointed out, might appear deceptively low, but a yearly increase of 2 percent means a doubling in thirty-five years, while a 3 percent increase implies a doubling in twenty-four years. Few countries, they argued, are prepared to double their food and energy supplies, housing, and educational and medical facilities in so short a time, and as a consequence they forecast dire panoramas of mass starvation and immiseration. Governments and international institutions were encouraged to take resolute measures to limit further increase in the growth rates, though the reproductive momentum of the already existing population implied that growth itself would continue for decades to come. “POPULATION EXPLOSION: Unique in human experience, an event which happened yesterday but which everyone swears won’t happen until tomorrow,” novelist John Brunner summed up the problem sarcastically in his novel Stand on Zanzibar.

The political controversies that ensued from this concern are well known. Millions of people did starve in the developing world in the 1970s and 1980s, though not at the rate environmentalists had predicted. Leftist critics, especially, argued that these deaths were due to problems in food distribution and more generally to staggering social inequalities rather than any overall scarcity. Population control measures, including the one-child policy in China and widespread sterilization campaigns in India, came under criticism for their disregard of individual rights and their neocolonial imposition of reproductive constraints on some of the world’s poorest populations. More broadly, critics asked whether looming scarcity crises and environmental devastation were caused principally by rampant population growth in the developing world or by rampant increases in consumption in the developed world.

By the 1990s, however, most of these controversies had abated. Even though the world population reached six billion in October 1999—double the number of 1960—this event was no longer accompanied by the images of mass starvation and nightmarishly overcrowded spaces it conjured up in the 1960s and 1970s. In part, this is no doubt due to changed growth projections for the future. Although the world population will, according to the most recent UN projections, continue to grow until the middle of the twenty-first century and will add approximately another 40 percent to the 2005 figure of 6.5 billion (the UN forecasts a population of 9.1 billion for 2050), it is now clear that this increase will affect particular regions in very different ways. Whereas a number of industrialized nations, for example Japan, Italy, Germany, the Baltic states, and most of the countries that succeeded the Soviet Union, will face shrinking populations, other countries such as India, Pakistan, China, and several states of sub-Saharan Africa will continue to grow, with the attendant challenges of providing education, jobs, and medical care to an ever-increasing number of people. As far as population figures are concerned, then, the future will be a divided one, with industrialized countries significantly less affected by continued population growth than in the past.

Based on the passage, which of the following statements is NOT correct?

【題組共用題幹】

In the environmental vision of the planet as it emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, few issues galvanized political debates as well as the cultural imagination as much as what was then referred to as “overpopulation.” Demographers and environmentalists pointed not only to the growth of Earth’s human population—from approximately five hundred million in 1650 to one billion around 1850, two billion in 1930, and three billion in 1960—but also the rapidly accelerating pace of this increase, warning that it might lead to unprecedented environmental devastation and human misery. Annual percentage increases in populations, they pointed out, might appear deceptively low, but a yearly increase of 2 percent means a doubling in thirty-five years, while a 3 percent increase implies a doubling in twenty-four years. Few countries, they argued, are prepared to double their food and energy supplies, housing, and educational and medical facilities in so short a time, and as a consequence they forecast dire panoramas of mass starvation and immiseration. Governments and international institutions were encouraged to take resolute measures to limit further increase in the growth rates, though the reproductive momentum of the already existing population implied that growth itself would continue for decades to come. “POPULATION EXPLOSION: Unique in human experience, an event which happened yesterday but which everyone swears won’t happen until tomorrow,” novelist John Brunner summed up the problem sarcastically in his novel Stand on Zanzibar.

The political controversies that ensued from this concern are well known. Millions of people did starve in the developing world in the 1970s and 1980s, though not at the rate environmentalists had predicted. Leftist critics, especially, argued that these deaths were due to problems in food distribution and more generally to staggering social inequalities rather than any overall scarcity. Population control measures, including the one-child policy in China and widespread sterilization campaigns in India, came under criticism for their disregard of individual rights and their neocolonial imposition of reproductive constraints on some of the world’s poorest populations. More broadly, critics asked whether looming scarcity crises and environmental devastation were caused principally by rampant population growth in the developing world or by rampant increases in consumption in the developed world.

By the 1990s, however, most of these controversies had abated. Even though the world population reached six billion in October 1999—double the number of 1960—this event was no longer accompanied by the images of mass starvation and nightmarishly overcrowded spaces it conjured up in the 1960s and 1970s. In part, this is no doubt due to changed growth projections for the future. Although the world population will, according to the most recent UN projections, continue to grow until the middle of the twenty-first century and will add approximately another 40 percent to the 2005 figure of 6.5 billion (the UN forecasts a population of 9.1 billion for 2050), it is now clear that this increase will affect particular regions in very different ways. Whereas a number of industrialized nations, for example Japan, Italy, Germany, the Baltic states, and most of the countries that succeeded the Soviet Union, will face shrinking populations, other countries such as India, Pakistan, China, and several states of sub-Saharan Africa will continue to grow, with the attendant challenges of providing education, jobs, and medical care to an ever-increasing number of people. As far as population figures are concerned, then, the future will be a divided one, with industrialized countries significantly less affected by continued population growth than in the past.

Which of the following most closely captures what the author means by saying “the future will be a divided one” in the third paragraph?

【題組共用題幹】

In the environmental vision of the planet as it emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, few issues galvanized political debates as well as the cultural imagination as much as what was then referred to as “overpopulation.” Demographers and environmentalists pointed not only to the growth of Earth’s human population—from approximately five hundred million in 1650 to one billion around 1850, two billion in 1930, and three billion in 1960—but also the rapidly accelerating pace of this increase, warning that it might lead to unprecedented environmental devastation and human misery. Annual percentage increases in populations, they pointed out, might appear deceptively low, but a yearly increase of 2 percent means a doubling in thirty-five years, while a 3 percent increase implies a doubling in twenty-four years. Few countries, they argued, are prepared to double their food and energy supplies, housing, and educational and medical facilities in so short a time, and as a consequence they forecast dire panoramas of mass starvation and immiseration. Governments and international institutions were encouraged to take resolute measures to limit further increase in the growth rates, though the reproductive momentum of the already existing population implied that growth itself would continue for decades to come. “POPULATION EXPLOSION: Unique in human experience, an event which happened yesterday but which everyone swears won’t happen until tomorrow,” novelist John Brunner summed up the problem sarcastically in his novel Stand on Zanzibar.

The political controversies that ensued from this concern are well known. Millions of people did starve in the developing world in the 1970s and 1980s, though not at the rate environmentalists had predicted. Leftist critics, especially, argued that these deaths were due to problems in food distribution and more generally to staggering social inequalities rather than any overall scarcity. Population control measures, including the one-child policy in China and widespread sterilization campaigns in India, came under criticism for their disregard of individual rights and their neocolonial imposition of reproductive constraints on some of the world’s poorest populations. More broadly, critics asked whether looming scarcity crises and environmental devastation were caused principally by rampant population growth in the developing world or by rampant increases in consumption in the developed world.

By the 1990s, however, most of these controversies had abated. Even though the world population reached six billion in October 1999—double the number of 1960—this event was no longer accompanied by the images of mass starvation and nightmarishly overcrowded spaces it conjured up in the 1960s and 1970s. In part, this is no doubt due to changed growth projections for the future. Although the world population will, according to the most recent UN projections, continue to grow until the middle of the twenty-first century and will add approximately another 40 percent to the 2005 figure of 6.5 billion (the UN forecasts a population of 9.1 billion for 2050), it is now clear that this increase will affect particular regions in very different ways. Whereas a number of industrialized nations, for example Japan, Italy, Germany, the Baltic states, and most of the countries that succeeded the Soviet Union, will face shrinking populations, other countries such as India, Pakistan, China, and several states of sub-Saharan Africa will continue to grow, with the attendant challenges of providing education, jobs, and medical care to an ever-increasing number of people. As far as population figures are concerned, then, the future will be a divided one, with industrialized countries significantly less affected by continued population growth than in the past.

According to the author, demographers and environmentalists in the 1960s and 1970s believed that

【題組共用題幹】

In the environmental vision of the planet as it emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, few issues galvanized political debates as well as the cultural imagination as much as what was then referred to as “overpopulation.” Demographers and environmentalists pointed not only to the growth of Earth’s human population—from approximately five hundred million in 1650 to one billion around 1850, two billion in 1930, and three billion in 1960—but also the rapidly accelerating pace of this increase, warning that it might lead to unprecedented environmental devastation and human misery. Annual percentage increases in populations, they pointed out, might appear deceptively low, but a yearly increase of 2 percent means a doubling in thirty-five years, while a 3 percent increase implies a doubling in twenty-four years. Few countries, they argued, are prepared to double their food and energy supplies, housing, and educational and medical facilities in so short a time, and as a consequence they forecast dire panoramas of mass starvation and immiseration. Governments and international institutions were encouraged to take resolute measures to limit further increase in the growth rates, though the reproductive momentum of the already existing population implied that growth itself would continue for decades to come. “POPULATION EXPLOSION: Unique in human experience, an event which happened yesterday but which everyone swears won’t happen until tomorrow,” novelist John Brunner summed up the problem sarcastically in his novel Stand on Zanzibar.

The political controversies that ensued from this concern are well known. Millions of people did starve in the developing world in the 1970s and 1980s, though not at the rate environmentalists had predicted. Leftist critics, especially, argued that these deaths were due to problems in food distribution and more generally to staggering social inequalities rather than any overall scarcity. Population control measures, including the one-child policy in China and widespread sterilization campaigns in India, came under criticism for their disregard of individual rights and their neocolonial imposition of reproductive constraints on some of the world’s poorest populations. More broadly, critics asked whether looming scarcity crises and environmental devastation were caused principally by rampant population growth in the developing world or by rampant increases in consumption in the developed world.

By the 1990s, however, most of these controversies had abated. Even though the world population reached six billion in October 1999—double the number of 1960—this event was no longer accompanied by the images of mass starvation and nightmarishly overcrowded spaces it conjured up in the 1960s and 1970s. In part, this is no doubt due to changed growth projections for the future. Although the world population will, according to the most recent UN projections, continue to grow until the middle of the twenty-first century and will add approximately another 40 percent to the 2005 figure of 6.5 billion (the UN forecasts a population of 9.1 billion for 2050), it is now clear that this increase will affect particular regions in very different ways. Whereas a number of industrialized nations, for example Japan, Italy, Germany, the Baltic states, and most of the countries that succeeded the Soviet Union, will face shrinking populations, other countries such as India, Pakistan, China, and several states of sub-Saharan Africa will continue to grow, with the attendant challenges of providing education, jobs, and medical care to an ever-increasing number of people. As far as population figures are concerned, then, the future will be a divided one, with industrialized countries significantly less affected by continued population growth than in the past.

Which of the following is closest in meaning to the word “galvanized” in the first sentence of the passage?

【題組共用題幹】

In 1969, Stanford social psychologist Philip Zimbardo conducted a simple and daring experiment. He parked cars in two different locations: one in a sketchy neighborhood in New York’s Bronx and the other in Palo Alto, California, near his home university. The license plates were removed from the cars and the hoods were raised to suggest that the cars had been left following an episode of mechanical trouble. Zimbardo’s research assistants waited nearby but out of sight to watch and film the result. In the Bronx, the abandoned car was stripped quickly. The acts of vandalism began almost before the assistants had a chance to move out of sight and to set up their camera. In Palo Alto, the car was left intact for many days. Indeed, one passerby lowered the hood of the car during a rainstorm to protect the interior. Zimbardo interpreted this straightforward result as having been a result of differences in feelings of community and reciprocity in the two neighborhoods. Just as the hallways of Pruitt-Igoe had apparently belonged to nobody, the streets of the Bronx were not considered to be a part of the shared space of a community with its inherent requirement that residents watch over and care for the contents of the space.

In a second phase of the experiment, Zimbardo took one additional step: he smashed the windshield of the car in Palo Alto. Not long afterward, he began to see the same acts of theft and vandalism toward the car at the second site as he had seen in the Bronx. Political scientist James Wilson and criminologist George Kelling used this simple observation, publicized not long after the experiment in an article in Time magazine, as the cornerstone of a major new theory describing the origins of urban crime. The key argument of Wilson and Kelling’s so-called broken windows theory was that physical signs of disorder—broken or boarded up windows, litter, or graffiti—served as overt signals that nobody cared about the surrounding environment and this evident lack of caring encouraged crime. If Wilson and Kelling were right then a key corollary would be that any efforts taken to minimize signs of physical disorder would also discourage crime.

Based on the passage, which of the following is NOT correct?

【題組共用題幹】

In 1969, Stanford social psychologist Philip Zimbardo conducted a simple and daring experiment. He parked cars in two different locations: one in a sketchy neighborhood in New York’s Bronx and the other in Palo Alto, California, near his home university. The license plates were removed from the cars and the hoods were raised to suggest that the cars had been left following an episode of mechanical trouble. Zimbardo’s research assistants waited nearby but out of sight to watch and film the result. In the Bronx, the abandoned car was stripped quickly. The acts of vandalism began almost before the assistants had a chance to move out of sight and to set up their camera. In Palo Alto, the car was left intact for many days. Indeed, one passerby lowered the hood of the car during a rainstorm to protect the interior. Zimbardo interpreted this straightforward result as having been a result of differences in feelings of community and reciprocity in the two neighborhoods. Just as the hallways of Pruitt-Igoe had apparently belonged to nobody, the streets of the Bronx were not considered to be a part of the shared space of a community with its inherent requirement that residents watch over and care for the contents of the space.

In a second phase of the experiment, Zimbardo took one additional step: he smashed the windshield of the car in Palo Alto. Not long afterward, he began to see the same acts of theft and vandalism toward the car at the second site as he had seen in the Bronx. Political scientist James Wilson and criminologist George Kelling used this simple observation, publicized not long after the experiment in an article in Time magazine, as the cornerstone of a major new theory describing the origins of urban crime. The key argument of Wilson and Kelling’s so-called broken windows theory was that physical signs of disorder—broken or boarded up windows, litter, or graffiti—served as overt signals that nobody cared about the surrounding environment and this evident lack of caring encouraged crime. If Wilson and Kelling were right then a key corollary would be that any efforts taken to minimize signs of physical disorder would also discourage crime.

Zimbardo’s experiment was highly regarded by James Wilson and George Kelling because they believed

【題組共用題幹】

In 1969, Stanford social psychologist Philip Zimbardo conducted a simple and daring experiment. He parked cars in two different locations: one in a sketchy neighborhood in New York’s Bronx and the other in Palo Alto, California, near his home university. The license plates were removed from the cars and the hoods were raised to suggest that the cars had been left following an episode of mechanical trouble. Zimbardo’s research assistants waited nearby but out of sight to watch and film the result. In the Bronx, the abandoned car was stripped quickly. The acts of vandalism began almost before the assistants had a chance to move out of sight and to set up their camera. In Palo Alto, the car was left intact for many days. Indeed, one passerby lowered the hood of the car during a rainstorm to protect the interior. Zimbardo interpreted this straightforward result as having been a result of differences in feelings of community and reciprocity in the two neighborhoods. Just as the hallways of Pruitt-Igoe had apparently belonged to nobody, the streets of the Bronx were not considered to be a part of the shared space of a community with its inherent requirement that residents watch over and care for the contents of the space.

In a second phase of the experiment, Zimbardo took one additional step: he smashed the windshield of the car in Palo Alto. Not long afterward, he began to see the same acts of theft and vandalism toward the car at the second site as he had seen in the Bronx. Political scientist James Wilson and criminologist George Kelling used this simple observation, publicized not long after the experiment in an article in Time magazine, as the cornerstone of a major new theory describing the origins of urban crime. The key argument of Wilson and Kelling’s so-called broken windows theory was that physical signs of disorder—broken or boarded up windows, litter, or graffiti—served as overt signals that nobody cared about the surrounding environment and this evident lack of caring encouraged crime. If Wilson and Kelling were right then a key corollary would be that any efforts taken to minimize signs of physical disorder would also discourage crime.

Here are three statements about the “broken windows theory”:

I. It’s a theory describing the origins of urban crime.

II. It argued that the physical signs of disorder in a location would very likely invite criminal activities.

III. For James Wilson and George Kelling, it’s the cornerstone of a major new theory describing the origins of urban crime.

Based on the passage,

【題組共用題幹】

In 1969, Stanford social psychologist Philip Zimbardo conducted a simple and daring experiment. He parked cars in two different locations: one in a sketchy neighborhood in New York’s Bronx and the other in Palo Alto, California, near his home university. The license plates were removed from the cars and the hoods were raised to suggest that the cars had been left following an episode of mechanical trouble. Zimbardo’s research assistants waited nearby but out of sight to watch and film the result. In the Bronx, the abandoned car was stripped quickly. The acts of vandalism began almost before the assistants had a chance to move out of sight and to set up their camera. In Palo Alto, the car was left intact for many days. Indeed, one passerby lowered the hood of the car during a rainstorm to protect the interior. Zimbardo interpreted this straightforward result as having been a result of differences in feelings of community and reciprocity in the two neighborhoods. Just as the hallways of Pruitt-Igoe had apparently belonged to nobody, the streets of the Bronx were not considered to be a part of the shared space of a community with its inherent requirement that residents watch over and care for the contents of the space.

In a second phase of the experiment, Zimbardo took one additional step: he smashed the windshield of the car in Palo Alto. Not long afterward, he began to see the same acts of theft and vandalism toward the car at the second site as he had seen in the Bronx. Political scientist James Wilson and criminologist George Kelling used this simple observation, publicized not long after the experiment in an article in Time magazine, as the cornerstone of a major new theory describing the origins of urban crime. The key argument of Wilson and Kelling’s so-called broken windows theory was that physical signs of disorder—broken or boarded up windows, litter, or graffiti—served as overt signals that nobody cared about the surrounding environment and this evident lack of caring encouraged crime. If Wilson and Kelling were right then a key corollary would be that any efforts taken to minimize signs of physical disorder would also discourage crime.

Which of the following best catches the meaning of “corollary” in the last sentence of the passage?

【題組共用題幹】

In 1969, Stanford social psychologist Philip Zimbardo conducted a simple and daring experiment. He parked cars in two different locations: one in a sketchy neighborhood in New York’s Bronx and the other in Palo Alto, California, near his home university. The license plates were removed from the cars and the hoods were raised to suggest that the cars had been left following an episode of mechanical trouble. Zimbardo’s research assistants waited nearby but out of sight to watch and film the result. In the Bronx, the abandoned car was stripped quickly. The acts of vandalism began almost before the assistants had a chance to move out of sight and to set up their camera. In Palo Alto, the car was left intact for many days. Indeed, one passerby lowered the hood of the car during a rainstorm to protect the interior. Zimbardo interpreted this straightforward result as having been a result of differences in feelings of community and reciprocity in the two neighborhoods. Just as the hallways of Pruitt-Igoe had apparently belonged to nobody, the streets of the Bronx were not considered to be a part of the shared space of a community with its inherent requirement that residents watch over and care for the contents of the space.

In a second phase of the experiment, Zimbardo took one additional step: he smashed the windshield of the car in Palo Alto. Not long afterward, he began to see the same acts of theft and vandalism toward the car at the second site as he had seen in the Bronx. Political scientist James Wilson and criminologist George Kelling used this simple observation, publicized not long after the experiment in an article in Time magazine, as the cornerstone of a major new theory describing the origins of urban crime. The key argument of Wilson and Kelling’s so-called broken windows theory was that physical signs of disorder—broken or boarded up windows, litter, or graffiti—served as overt signals that nobody cared about the surrounding environment and this evident lack of caring encouraged crime. If Wilson and Kelling were right then a key corollary would be that any efforts taken to minimize signs of physical disorder would also discourage crime.

Based on the passage, which of the following efforts would most likely be considered by the author as following the broken windows theory’s prescription for crime reduction?

【題組共用題幹】

Students in a Florida school district will be reading only excerpts from William Shakespeare’s plays for class rather than the full texts under redesigned curriculum guides developed, in part, to take into consideration the state’s “Don’t Say Gay” laws.

The changes to the Hillsborough County Public Schools’ curriculum guides were made with Florida’s new laws prohibiting classroom discussion about sexual orientation or gender identity in mind. Other reasons included revised state standards and an effort to get students to read a wide variety of books for new state exams, the school district said in an emailed statement on Tuesday.

Several Shakespeare plays use suggestive puns and innuendo, and it is implied that the protagonists have had premarital sex in “Romeo and Juliet.” Shakespeare’s books will be available for checkout at media centers at schools, said the district, which covers the Tampa area.

“First and foremost, we have not excluded Shakespeare from our high school curriculum. Students will still have the physical books to read excerpts in class,” the statement said. “Curriculum guides are continually reviewed and refined throughout the year to align with state standards and current law.”

In Lake County, outside Orlando, the school district reversed a decision, made in response to the legislation, to restrict access to a popular children’s book about a male penguin couple hatching a chick. The School Board of Lake County and Florida education officials last week asked a federal judge to toss out a First Amendment lawsuit that students and the authors of “And Tango Makes Three” filed in June. Their complaint challenged the restrictions and Florida’s new laws.

The lawsuit is moot because age restrictions on “And Tango Makes Three” were lifted following a Florida Department of Education memo that said the new law applied only to classroom instruction and not school libraries, according to motions filed Friday by Florida education officials and school board members.

From the standpoint of the school district in the passage, how does reading excerpts from Shakespeare’s plays better reflect its alignment with the new state laws?

【題組共用題幹】

Students in a Florida school district will be reading only excerpts from William Shakespeare’s plays for class rather than the full texts under redesigned curriculum guides developed, in part, to take into consideration the state’s “Don’t Say Gay” laws.

The changes to the Hillsborough County Public Schools’ curriculum guides were made with Florida’s new laws prohibiting classroom discussion about sexual orientation or gender identity in mind. Other reasons included revised state standards and an effort to get students to read a wide variety of books for new state exams, the school district said in an emailed statement on Tuesday.

Several Shakespeare plays use suggestive puns and innuendo, and it is implied that the protagonists have had premarital sex in “Romeo and Juliet.” Shakespeare’s books will be available for checkout at media centers at schools, said the district, which covers the Tampa area.

“First and foremost, we have not excluded Shakespeare from our high school curriculum. Students will still have the physical books to read excerpts in class,” the statement said. “Curriculum guides are continually reviewed and refined throughout the year to align with state standards and current law.”

In Lake County, outside Orlando, the school district reversed a decision, made in response to the legislation, to restrict access to a popular children’s book about a male penguin couple hatching a chick. The School Board of Lake County and Florida education officials last week asked a federal judge to toss out a First Amendment lawsuit that students and the authors of “And Tango Makes Three” filed in June. Their complaint challenged the restrictions and Florida’s new laws.

The lawsuit is moot because age restrictions on “And Tango Makes Three” were lifted following a Florida Department of Education memo that said the new law applied only to classroom instruction and not school libraries, according to motions filed Friday by Florida education officials and school board members.

What do “suggestive puns and innuendo” refer to in this context?

【題組共用題幹】

Students in a Florida school district will be reading only excerpts from William Shakespeare’s plays for class rather than the full texts under redesigned curriculum guides developed, in part, to take into consideration the state’s “Don’t Say Gay” laws.

The changes to the Hillsborough County Public Schools’ curriculum guides were made with Florida’s new laws prohibiting classroom discussion about sexual orientation or gender identity in mind. Other reasons included revised state standards and an effort to get students to read a wide variety of books for new state exams, the school district said in an emailed statement on Tuesday.

Several Shakespeare plays use suggestive puns and innuendo, and it is implied that the protagonists have had premarital sex in “Romeo and Juliet.” Shakespeare’s books will be available for checkout at media centers at schools, said the district, which covers the Tampa area.

“First and foremost, we have not excluded Shakespeare from our high school curriculum. Students will still have the physical books to read excerpts in class,” the statement said. “Curriculum guides are continually reviewed and refined throughout the year to align with state standards and current law.”

In Lake County, outside Orlando, the school district reversed a decision, made in response to the legislation, to restrict access to a popular children’s book about a male penguin couple hatching a chick. The School Board of Lake County and Florida education officials last week asked a federal judge to toss out a First Amendment lawsuit that students and the authors of “And Tango Makes Three” filed in June. Their complaint challenged the restrictions and Florida’s new laws.

The lawsuit is moot because age restrictions on “And Tango Makes Three” were lifted following a Florida Department of Education memo that said the new law applied only to classroom instruction and not school libraries, according to motions filed Friday by Florida education officials and school board members.

Based on the passage, which of the following can be an example of the violation of the new state laws?

【題組共用題幹】

Students in a Florida school district will be reading only excerpts from William Shakespeare’s plays for class rather than the full texts under redesigned curriculum guides developed, in part, to take into consideration the state’s “Don’t Say Gay” laws.

The changes to the Hillsborough County Public Schools’ curriculum guides were made with Florida’s new laws prohibiting classroom discussion about sexual orientation or gender identity in mind. Other reasons included revised state standards and an effort to get students to read a wide variety of books for new state exams, the school district said in an emailed statement on Tuesday.

Several Shakespeare plays use suggestive puns and innuendo, and it is implied that the protagonists have had premarital sex in “Romeo and Juliet.” Shakespeare’s books will be available for checkout at media centers at schools, said the district, which covers the Tampa area.

“First and foremost, we have not excluded Shakespeare from our high school curriculum. Students will still have the physical books to read excerpts in class,” the statement said. “Curriculum guides are continually reviewed and refined throughout the year to align with state standards and current law.”

In Lake County, outside Orlando, the school district reversed a decision, made in response to the legislation, to restrict access to a popular children’s book about a male penguin couple hatching a chick. The School Board of Lake County and Florida education officials last week asked a federal judge to toss out a First Amendment lawsuit that students and the authors of “And Tango Makes Three” filed in June. Their complaint challenged the restrictions and Florida’s new laws.

The lawsuit is moot because age restrictions on “And Tango Makes Three” were lifted following a Florida Department of Education memo that said the new law applied only to classroom instruction and not school libraries, according to motions filed Friday by Florida education officials and school board members.

In response to the new state laws mentioned in the passage, the school district of the Tampa area

【題組共用題幹】

Students in a Florida school district will be reading only excerpts from William Shakespeare’s plays for class rather than the full texts under redesigned curriculum guides developed, in part, to take into consideration the state’s “Don’t Say Gay” laws.

The changes to the Hillsborough County Public Schools’ curriculum guides were made with Florida’s new laws prohibiting classroom discussion about sexual orientation or gender identity in mind. Other reasons included revised state standards and an effort to get students to read a wide variety of books for new state exams, the school district said in an emailed statement on Tuesday.

Several Shakespeare plays use suggestive puns and innuendo, and it is implied that the protagonists have had premarital sex in “Romeo and Juliet.” Shakespeare’s books will be available for checkout at media centers at schools, said the district, which covers the Tampa area.

“First and foremost, we have not excluded Shakespeare from our high school curriculum. Students will still have the physical books to read excerpts in class,” the statement said. “Curriculum guides are continually reviewed and refined throughout the year to align with state standards and current law.”

In Lake County, outside Orlando, the school district reversed a decision, made in response to the legislation, to restrict access to a popular children’s book about a male penguin couple hatching a chick. The School Board of Lake County and Florida education officials last week asked a federal judge to toss out a First Amendment lawsuit that students and the authors of “And Tango Makes Three” filed in June. Their complaint challenged the restrictions and Florida’s new laws.

The lawsuit is moot because age restrictions on “And Tango Makes Three” were lifted following a Florida Department of Education memo that said the new law applied only to classroom instruction and not school libraries, according to motions filed Friday by Florida education officials and school board members.

Following a Florida Department of Education memo, mentioned in the last paragraph, the school district in Lake County

【題組共用題幹】

Consider the two most widely prevalent, quite modern official documents of personal identity: the birth certificate and the passport. Both were born in the nationalist nineteenth century and later became interlinked. It is true that in the Christianized regions of the world the registration of births long preceded the rise of capitalism. But these births were recorded locally and ecclesiastically in parish churches; their registration, foreshadowing imminent baptisms, signified the appearance of Christian souls in new corporeal forms. In the nineteenth century, however, registration was taken over by states that were increasingly assuming a national colouring. In industrially pre-eminent England, for example, the Registrar General’s office was created only in 1837. Compulsory registration of all births, whether to be followed by baptisms or not, did not come until 1876. Identifying each baby’s father and place of birth, the state’s certificates created the founding documents for the infant’s inclusion in or exclusion from citizenship. (He or she was no longer born in the parish of Egham but in the United Kingdom.) The passport, product of the vectoral convergence of migration and nationalism in an industrial age, was ready to confirm the baby’s political identity as it passed into adulthood.

The nexus of birth certificate and passport was institutionalized in an era in which women had no legal rights to political participation and the patriarchal family was the largely unquestioned norm. But in our time all this has radically changed. When the League of Nations was founded—and female suffrage was coming into its own—the ratio of divorces to marriages in the United States was about one to eight; today it is virtually one to two. The percentage of American babies born to never-married mothers has increased spectacularly from 4.2 per cent in 1960 to 30.6 per cent in 1990. The intranational as well as international nomadism of modern life has also contributed to making the nineteenth-century birth certificate a sort of counterfeit money. If, for example, we read that Mary Jones was born on October 25, 1970 in Duluth, to Robert Mason and Virginia Jones, or even Robert and Virginia Mason, we cannot nonchalantly infer that she was conceived in that same Duluth, was brought up here, or lives there now. We have no idea whether her grandparents are buried in Duluth, and, even if they were, we have few grounds for supposing that Mary will someday be buried alongside them. Is Virginia still a Mason? Or a Jones? Or something else again? What are the chances that Mary has much beyond periodic long-distance contact with either Robert or Virginia? How far is she identifiable, also to herself, as a Duluthian, a Mason, or a Jones?

The counterfeit quality or, shall we say, the low market value of the birth certificate is perhaps confirmed by the relative rareness of its forgery. Conversely, the huge volume of passport forgeries and the high prices they command show that in our age, when everyone is supposed to belong to some one of the United Nations, these documents have high truth-claims. But they are also counterfeits in the sense that they are less attestations of citizenship than of claims to participation in labour markets.

Based on the passage, the registration of births

【題組共用題幹】

Consider the two most widely prevalent, quite modern official documents of personal identity: the birth certificate and the passport. Both were born in the nationalist nineteenth century and later became interlinked. It is true that in the Christianized regions of the world the registration of births long preceded the rise of capitalism. But these births were recorded locally and ecclesiastically in parish churches; their registration, foreshadowing imminent baptisms, signified the appearance of Christian souls in new corporeal forms. In the nineteenth century, however, registration was taken over by states that were increasingly assuming a national colouring. In industrially pre-eminent England, for example, the Registrar General’s office was created only in 1837. Compulsory registration of all births, whether to be followed by baptisms or not, did not come until 1876. Identifying each baby’s father and place of birth, the state’s certificates created the founding documents for the infant’s inclusion in or exclusion from citizenship. (He or she was no longer born in the parish of Egham but in the United Kingdom.) The passport, product of the vectoral convergence of migration and nationalism in an industrial age, was ready to confirm the baby’s political identity as it passed into adulthood.

The nexus of birth certificate and passport was institutionalized in an era in which women had no legal rights to political participation and the patriarchal family was the largely unquestioned norm. But in our time all this has radically changed. When the League of Nations was founded—and female suffrage was coming into its own—the ratio of divorces to marriages in the United States was about one to eight; today it is virtually one to two. The percentage of American babies born to never-married mothers has increased spectacularly from 4.2 per cent in 1960 to 30.6 per cent in 1990. The intranational as well as international nomadism of modern life has also contributed to making the nineteenth-century birth certificate a sort of counterfeit money. If, for example, we read that Mary Jones was born on October 25, 1970 in Duluth, to Robert Mason and Virginia Jones, or even Robert and Virginia Mason, we cannot nonchalantly infer that she was conceived in that same Duluth, was brought up here, or lives there now. We have no idea whether her grandparents are buried in Duluth, and, even if they were, we have few grounds for supposing that Mary will someday be buried alongside them. Is Virginia still a Mason? Or a Jones? Or something else again? What are the chances that Mary has much beyond periodic long-distance contact with either Robert or Virginia? How far is she identifiable, also to herself, as a Duluthian, a Mason, or a Jones?

The counterfeit quality or, shall we say, the low market value of the birth certificate is perhaps confirmed by the relative rareness of its forgery. Conversely, the huge volume of passport forgeries and the high prices they command show that in our age, when everyone is supposed to belong to some one of the United Nations, these documents have high truth-claims. But they are also counterfeits in the sense that they are less attestations of citizenship than of claims to participation in labour markets.

Which of the following best captures the point which the author aims to make by the example of Mary Jones?

【題組共用題幹】

Consider the two most widely prevalent, quite modern official documents of personal identity: the birth certificate and the passport. Both were born in the nationalist nineteenth century and later became interlinked. It is true that in the Christianized regions of the world the registration of births long preceded the rise of capitalism. But these births were recorded locally and ecclesiastically in parish churches; their registration, foreshadowing imminent baptisms, signified the appearance of Christian souls in new corporeal forms. In the nineteenth century, however, registration was taken over by states that were increasingly assuming a national colouring. In industrially pre-eminent England, for example, the Registrar General’s office was created only in 1837. Compulsory registration of all births, whether to be followed by baptisms or not, did not come until 1876. Identifying each baby’s father and place of birth, the state’s certificates created the founding documents for the infant’s inclusion in or exclusion from citizenship. (He or she was no longer born in the parish of Egham but in the United Kingdom.) The passport, product of the vectoral convergence of migration and nationalism in an industrial age, was ready to confirm the baby’s political identity as it passed into adulthood.

The nexus of birth certificate and passport was institutionalized in an era in which women had no legal rights to political participation and the patriarchal family was the largely unquestioned norm. But in our time all this has radically changed. When the League of Nations was founded—and female suffrage was coming into its own—the ratio of divorces to marriages in the United States was about one to eight; today it is virtually one to two. The percentage of American babies born to never-married mothers has increased spectacularly from 4.2 per cent in 1960 to 30.6 per cent in 1990. The intranational as well as international nomadism of modern life has also contributed to making the nineteenth-century birth certificate a sort of counterfeit money. If, for example, we read that Mary Jones was born on October 25, 1970 in Duluth, to Robert Mason and Virginia Jones, or even Robert and Virginia Mason, we cannot nonchalantly infer that she was conceived in that same Duluth, was brought up here, or lives there now. We have no idea whether her grandparents are buried in Duluth, and, even if they were, we have few grounds for supposing that Mary will someday be buried alongside them. Is Virginia still a Mason? Or a Jones? Or something else again? What are the chances that Mary has much beyond periodic long-distance contact with either Robert or Virginia? How far is she identifiable, also to herself, as a Duluthian, a Mason, or a Jones?

The counterfeit quality or, shall we say, the low market value of the birth certificate is perhaps confirmed by the relative rareness of its forgery. Conversely, the huge volume of passport forgeries and the high prices they command show that in our age, when everyone is supposed to belong to some one of the United Nations, these documents have high truth-claims. But they are also counterfeits in the sense that they are less attestations of citizenship than of claims to participation in labour markets.

According to the author, during the time when the births were locally and ecclesiastically recorded in parish churches,

【題組共用題幹】

Consider the two most widely prevalent, quite modern official documents of personal identity: the birth certificate and the passport. Both were born in the nationalist nineteenth century and later became interlinked. It is true that in the Christianized regions of the world the registration of births long preceded the rise of capitalism. But these births were recorded locally and ecclesiastically in parish churches; their registration, foreshadowing imminent baptisms, signified the appearance of Christian souls in new corporeal forms. In the nineteenth century, however, registration was taken over by states that were increasingly assuming a national colouring. In industrially pre-eminent England, for example, the Registrar General’s office was created only in 1837. Compulsory registration of all births, whether to be followed by baptisms or not, did not come until 1876. Identifying each baby’s father and place of birth, the state’s certificates created the founding documents for the infant’s inclusion in or exclusion from citizenship. (He or she was no longer born in the parish of Egham but in the United Kingdom.) The passport, product of the vectoral convergence of migration and nationalism in an industrial age, was ready to confirm the baby’s political identity as it passed into adulthood.

The nexus of birth certificate and passport was institutionalized in an era in which women had no legal rights to political participation and the patriarchal family was the largely unquestioned norm. But in our time all this has radically changed. When the League of Nations was founded—and female suffrage was coming into its own—the ratio of divorces to marriages in the United States was about one to eight; today it is virtually one to two. The percentage of American babies born to never-married mothers has increased spectacularly from 4.2 per cent in 1960 to 30.6 per cent in 1990. The intranational as well as international nomadism of modern life has also contributed to making the nineteenth-century birth certificate a sort of counterfeit money. If, for example, we read that Mary Jones was born on October 25, 1970 in Duluth, to Robert Mason and Virginia Jones, or even Robert and Virginia Mason, we cannot nonchalantly infer that she was conceived in that same Duluth, was brought up here, or lives there now. We have no idea whether her grandparents are buried in Duluth, and, even if they were, we have few grounds for supposing that Mary will someday be buried alongside them. Is Virginia still a Mason? Or a Jones? Or something else again? What are the chances that Mary has much beyond periodic long-distance contact with either Robert or Virginia? How far is she identifiable, also to herself, as a Duluthian, a Mason, or a Jones?

The counterfeit quality or, shall we say, the low market value of the birth certificate is perhaps confirmed by the relative rareness of its forgery. Conversely, the huge volume of passport forgeries and the high prices they command show that in our age, when everyone is supposed to belong to some one of the United Nations, these documents have high truth-claims. But they are also counterfeits in the sense that they are less attestations of citizenship than of claims to participation in labour markets.

Based on the passage, which of the following claims about the passport is NOT correct?

【題組共用題幹】

Consider the two most widely prevalent, quite modern official documents of personal identity: the birth certificate and the passport. Both were born in the nationalist nineteenth century and later became interlinked. It is true that in the Christianized regions of the world the registration of births long preceded the rise of capitalism. But these births were recorded locally and ecclesiastically in parish churches; their registration, foreshadowing imminent baptisms, signified the appearance of Christian souls in new corporeal forms. In the nineteenth century, however, registration was taken over by states that were increasingly assuming a national colouring. In industrially pre-eminent England, for example, the Registrar General’s office was created only in 1837. Compulsory registration of all births, whether to be followed by baptisms or not, did not come until 1876. Identifying each baby’s father and place of birth, the state’s certificates created the founding documents for the infant’s inclusion in or exclusion from citizenship. (He or she was no longer born in the parish of Egham but in the United Kingdom.) The passport, product of the vectoral convergence of migration and nationalism in an industrial age, was ready to confirm the baby’s political identity as it passed into adulthood.

The nexus of birth certificate and passport was institutionalized in an era in which women had no legal rights to political participation and the patriarchal family was the largely unquestioned norm. But in our time all this has radically changed. When the League of Nations was founded—and female suffrage was coming into its own—the ratio of divorces to marriages in the United States was about one to eight; today it is virtually one to two. The percentage of American babies born to never-married mothers has increased spectacularly from 4.2 per cent in 1960 to 30.6 per cent in 1990. The intranational as well as international nomadism of modern life has also contributed to making the nineteenth-century birth certificate a sort of counterfeit money. If, for example, we read that Mary Jones was born on October 25, 1970 in Duluth, to Robert Mason and Virginia Jones, or even Robert and Virginia Mason, we cannot nonchalantly infer that she was conceived in that same Duluth, was brought up here, or lives there now. We have no idea whether her grandparents are buried in Duluth, and, even if they were, we have few grounds for supposing that Mary will someday be buried alongside them. Is Virginia still a Mason? Or a Jones? Or something else again? What are the chances that Mary has much beyond periodic long-distance contact with either Robert or Virginia? How far is she identifiable, also to herself, as a Duluthian, a Mason, or a Jones?

The counterfeit quality or, shall we say, the low market value of the birth certificate is perhaps confirmed by the relative rareness of its forgery. Conversely, the huge volume of passport forgeries and the high prices they command show that in our age, when everyone is supposed to belong to some one of the United Nations, these documents have high truth-claims. But they are also counterfeits in the sense that they are less attestations of citizenship than of claims to participation in labour markets.

Here are three statements with regard to the nineteenth-century England:

I. The nineteenth-century England held a dominant position in industry.
II. The nineteenth-century England was increasingly assuming a national colouring.
III. Women had the right to vote in the nineteenth-century England.

Based on the passage,